Kieran Lawrence looks at autonomous weapons and the effect they could have on modern warfare
Continuing a series on world leaders, Miles Deverson takes a look at Angela Merkel
Ben Bland examines the fallout from the Iowa caucuses and looks forward to the New Hampshire primaries.
In the first of a series on world leaders, Miles Deverson takes a look at Nicholas Sarkozy
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has admitted to the world that his domestic security forces are not yet ready for the transition from occupational rule to domestic protection.
Karzai abandoned his pledge to cease the operations of certain private security firms by March 2012. He has now extended the date in which they can operate to September 2013, a staggering 18 months later. He attended an anti-corruption event in the capital, Kabul, and gave his “permission for them (to carry on working) for one and a half years more…and one and a half years later our ministers will close them.”
Karzai has been a frequent critic of these private contractors, which he again makes clear in his speech on Sunday “prevalence of security contractors weakened the state by providing many of the services that the public sector otherwise would.” In line with traditional counterinsurgency doctrine, his firm belief that security and protective duties must be handed to the host population is absolutely vital if an insurgency is to be countered and defeated.
Reuters interviewed a contractor who had been operating in the region said of the speech “it is in fact an admission that the much heralded Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) are unable to deliver within the time frame, both in numbers and experience.”
To some this may not seem surprising considering that violence is at its deadliest since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. In the political dimension, the Taliban insurgency continues to rage on. But, the targeted assaults on Shi’ite Muslim ceremonies last Tuesday, has raised fears that sectarian conflict may make a devastating appearance after a long period of absence. Karzai claimed Sunday that the number killed had reached 80. This was higher than the original estimate of 56. Until now, it has avoided the sectarian bloodshed that has been occurring in Pakistan and Iraq.
So what are the needs and what are the concerns?
The plan to transfer security responsibilities to the Afghan security forces is the core of the strategy of the coalition forces. A successful counterinsurgency becomes what it is when it realises that this is a battle for the “hearts and minds” of the people. This time-honoured principle recognises that the outcome of an intra-state war is entirely dependent on the loyalties of the population.
A population-centric approach to such a conflict is essential. The most successful and important method of securing the support of the people is through the use of forces that come from that population in the first place.
The Taliban insurgency is well aware that its survival lies in the hands of the population. The people are its lifeline. To recall a famous reference to Mao the insurgent must “swim among the people.” It is dependent on them for their food, clothes, shelter and intelligence. The priority of the counter-insurgent is to drain this and pluck out the opposition like a fish, so to speak.
This is a brief definition of what an insurgent and counter-insurgent must do in this war. The Afghan Security Forces have an indispensable role in defeating the Taliban insurgency. The transfer of responsibilities cannot happen unless the Afghan government and coalition forces can recruit, train and retain soldiers.
However, Karzai has indicated that this process is in jeopardy. The Taliban and the Haqqani network (Pakistan based) are attempting to disrupt this process through infiltration and violent attacks. The violence on Tuesday may have been an attempt to provoke the emergence of sectarian conflict, in order to prolong the war.
The demoralisation of the coalition forces is exactly what the Taliban and other Islamist insurgent groups want. They are severely outnumbered in terms of manpower and this is their only method of winning against a coalition of global powers.
Attempts to create a credible police force are faltering badly. Even the best Afghan units lack training, discipline and sufficient reinforcements. In one new unit of Baghlan Province, soldiers were found cowering in ditches rather than fighting.
The Afghan Army is plagued by inefficiency and endemic corruption. Training efforts have been drastically slowed by the corruption, widespread illiteracy, vanishing supplies and lack of discipline. It is estimated the army writes off 2,000 soldiers a month in the belief that they have been on absence without leave for too long. About a quarter of officers abandon their posts.
The common response is to inject new and inexperienced soldiers into a war, in which training and experience is fundamental. A counter-insurgency effort must go hand in hand with political moves to win over the population. This is not a demonstration of who has the most firepower. The point is that the Taliban has been able to endure the last decade because of the failure to find and destroy such an elusive enemy.
In these circumstances, it is not hard to see why President Karzai is acting in the way that he is.
You must log in to submit a comment.
